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Chapter One  
 1.1 Introduction 
Money laundering is defined as the process of converting the proceeds derived from a wide 
range of underlying criminal offences, called predicate offences, to apparently legitimate 
property.1 In other words, it is the process of washing away the stain of illegality from the 
proceeds of crime in order to give them the appearance of legality.2 In fact, the 
nomenclature of the practice itself was inspired by America’s notorious gangster Al 
Capone’s practice of channelling the proceeds of his criminal enterprise through his 
laundromats in order to cloak their illegality so as to endow them with an appearance of 
legality.3  The crime of money laundering has been a scourge on the economies of the 
world, hence it has become a crime of international concern. The international community 
has developed numerous international treaty norms obligating states to criminalise money 
laundering. These norms, when incorporated into national legislation, are expected to serve 
as the legal basis not only for national prosecution of money laundering offences but also 
for international mutual legal assistance in AML (for example, international co-operation in 
the confiscation of criminal proceeds and extradition of money launderers).4   
                                                          
1 Nguyen C ‘Criminalisation of Money Laundering in the International Anti-Money Laundering Regime and its 
Adoption by Vietnam’ Australian Journal of Asian Law (2013) 14(1) at 2.   
 
2 Gordon R K ‘Anti-Money Laundering Policies- Selected Legal, Political, and Economic Issues’  International 
Monetary Fund; Legal Department; Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law (1999) (1) 407. 
  
3 Van Duyne P C ‘Money laundering policy’. Fears and Facts (2003) 69,  available at 
http://petrusvanduyne.nl/files/Witwassen%20Fears%20and%20Facts.pdf (Accessed on 23 September 2016).  
 
4 Nguyen C (2013: 7).   
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As indicated above, the crime of money laundering has become a crime of global concern 
with governments, international organisations, financial institutions, regulators of financial 
institutions and law enforcement agencies, with all of them investing in efforts to prevent 
and combat it. Prior to the 1980s, the practice of laundering money was not a criminal 
offence anywhere in the world.5  The United States of America pioneered the efforts to 
criminalise the practice of money laundering. These efforts to fight money laundering were 
necessitated by chronic drug and substance abuse, and the increase in international drug 
trafficking by organised international criminal enterprises.6 Money laundering was only 
dealt with in so far as it related to drug trafficking and dealing. 
The first piece of legislation aimed at tackling the scourge of money laundering in the United 
States of America was the Banking Secrecy Act of 1970.7 This law did not deal with money 
laundering specifically. It dealt mainly with bank secrecy practices and touched on only few 
aspects of money laundering. The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, however, 
addressed the issue of money laundering comprehensively. It is the first enactment in the 
world to criminalise money laundering. It is the first specific anti-money laundering 
legislation.8 
At about the time the United States was enacting the above-mentioned laws, there was a 
growing recognition elsewhere that there was a need to combat money laundering.  
                                                          
5 Sharman J C ‘The Global Anti-Money Laundering Regime and Developing Countries: Damned if they Do, 
Damned if they Don’t?’ Government and International Relations University of Sydney, NSW (2006) 2.  
 
6 Gordon R K (1999: 407). 
 
7 Unger B and Van Waarden F ‘How to Dodge Drowning in Data? Rule- and Risk-Based Anti-Money Laundering 
Policies Compared’ Review of Law and Economics 5(2) (2009) 962. 
 
8 Unger B and Van Waarden F (2009: 962). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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This awareness culminated in the adoption of the United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances by the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1988 (Vienna Convention). As was the case with the US anti-money laundering 
laws, the Vienna Convention regulates money laundering only in so far as it pertains to 
laundering the proceeds derived from the lucrative illicit trade in narcotic drugs and 
psychotic substances, hence the full name of the Convention.9 The Vienna Convention 
places an obligation on states parties to criminalise drug-related money laundering and 
other drug-related processes such as production, cultivation, possession, organisation, 
management and financing of trafficking operations.10  
After the adoption of the Vienna Convention, G7 countries established the Financial Action 
Task Force in 1989.11 This inter-governmental body’s mandate is to set global standards for 
combating money laundering and financing of terrorism. The FATF supervises how its 
standards are implemented at the national level.12 The FATF first set the money laundering 
standards in 1990. The standards have been revised on four occasions in order to ensure 
that they remain up to date and relevant. They were last revised in 2012.13 
                                                          
9 See United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.  
  
10 Stewart D P ‘Internalising the War on Drugs: The UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances’  18 Denver Journal of International Law and Policies (1990) 387. 
 
11 Gill M and Taylor G ‘Preventing Money Laundering or Obstructing Business?’  British Journal of Criminology 
(2004) 583. 
 
12 Introductory note to the FATF Recommendations: International Standards on Combating Money Laundering 
and the Financing of Terrorism Proliferation (16 February 2012),  available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF Recommendations.pdf (accessed on 1 
September   2016). 
 
13 FATF Standards, available at www.fatf-gafi.org/about/ (accessed on 23 August 2016). 
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Since the Vienna Convention of 1988, there have been further international developments 
in strengthening the AML/CFT legal regime. In the year 2000, the United Nations General 
Assembly adopted the Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (the Palermo 
Convention). This Convention extends the predicate offences of money laundering beyond 
drug-related offences. It obligates states parties to criminalise money laundering which is 
predicated on all other serious offences.14 
1.2 Money Laundering, Illicit Financial Flows and the Anti-Money Laundering Legal 
Regime in Malawi 
Malawi, like many African countries and other developing countries, has been heavily 
affected by the plague of money laundering and other serious economic crimes. Grand 
corruption and tax evasion are the most prevalent predicate offences of money laundering 
in Malawi.15 
The widespread nature of public corruption and thievery was well demonstrated when a 
criminal scheme of serious looting of public funds by public officials and business magnates 
was exposed in the local media towards the end of 2013. This financial scandal involved the 
pilfering of 13 billion Malawian Kwacha from the treasury in a space of six months.16 The 
crux of the scam involved public officers making sham payments from state coffers to 
companies which had no contracts with government or which had not rendered any services 
to the government. In other words, public officials and influential members in the business 
                                                          
14 Art 5(3) of the Palermo Convention. 
15 Yikona S, Slot B, Geller M et al Ill-Gotten Money and the Economy: Experiences from Malawi and Namibia 
(2011) 25.  
16 Baker Tilly Report on Fraud and Mismanagement of Malawi Government Finances: Covering transactions 
and controls in the six month period 1 April 2013-30 September 2013 (2014),  available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/285877/20140221_National
_Audit_Office_Malawi - Forensic_Audit_Report - FINAL_ISSUED.pdf (accessed on 28 September 2016). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
5 
 
community connived to misappropriate public funds. The scam has had dire consequences, 
for the poor especially, who constitute the majority of the population.  
Apart from corruption and tax evasion, Malawi has been heavily affected also by illicit 
financial flows. According to Global Financial Integrity, illicit financial flows consist in the 
cross-border movement of money that is illegally earned, transferred, or utilised. This 
definition was adopted by the African Union Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa 
(2015).17 Malawi’s illicit financial flows constitute 12-14 percent of the country’s gross 
domestic product (GDP).18 This represents a serious haemorrhaging of funds out of the 
country which could have been utilised towards its development. 
Malawi is part of the global campaign to fight and stamp out the scourge of money 
laundering. This is evinced by the fact that Malawi is a party to several international 
instruments on money laundering and is also a member of a regional body involved in the 
fight against money laundering. Malawi is party to the Vienna and Palermo Conventions 
mentioned above, as well as the United Nations Convention against Corruption of 2003 
(Merida Convention). Malawi is also a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-
money Laundering Group (ESSAMLG). This is a grouping of states from the eastern and 
southern part of the African continent whose aim is to combat money laundering and 
terrorist financing, based on the standards set by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and 
other similar styled bodies. 
In 2006, Malawi enacted the Money Laundering, Proceeds of Serious Crimes and Terrorist 
Financing Act of 2006. The long title of the Act states that it is “an Act to enable the unlawful 
                                                          
17 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the African Union Commission Report of the High Level 
Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, “Track it, Stop it and Get it: Illicit Financial Flows” (2015). 
18 Report of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa (2015: 12). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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proceeds of all serious crime and terrorist financing to be identified, traced, frozen, seized 
and eventually confiscated; to establish a Financial Intelligence Unit for the better 
prevention, investigation and prosecution of money laundering, terrorist financing and 
other financial and serious crimes; to require financial institutions to take prudential 
measures to help combat money laundering and terrorist financing; and to provide for 
matters connected with or incidental to the foregoing”. 
1.3 The Concept of New Payment Methods 
Criminals have a keen interest in keeping their ill-gotten gains. They utilise all sorts of 
techniques to give their ill-gotten gains an appearance of legality. In most cases they adopt 
sophisticated techniques which elude law enforcement authorities, hence they avoid 
detection. Convoluted money laundering schemes necessitate a legal regime that covers 
various aspects of money laundering and terrorist financing. The law needs to adapt easily 
to new risks and threats posed by rapid advancements in the sphere of technology, since 
research has shown that criminals are more likely to use technologically inspired 
innovations to conceal their ill-gotten gains.19 Such technological innovation can be found in 
the field of new payment methods. These include prepaid cards, Internet payment systems, 
mobile payments and digital precious metals.20 These are perfectly legal methods used to 
                                                          
19 FATF Typologies Report on Money Laundering Using New Payment Methods (October 2006) FATF-GAFI: 
Paris, available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/methodsandtrends/documents/moneylaunderingusingnewpaymentmethods.html, 
(Accessed on 12 March 2016). 
20 FATF Typologies Report on Money Laundering Using New Payment Methods (October 2006) FATF-GAFI: 
Paris, available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/methodsandtrends/documents/moneylaunderingusingnewpaymentmethods.html, 
(Accessed on 12 March 2016). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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pay for goods and services and also to transfer funds from one individual to another. The 
afore-mentioned payment systems represent a move from the traditional payment methods 
such as cash and regular bank payment transactions. The novelty of these new payments 
may attract criminals and criminal organisations to utilise them to launder money and 
finance terrorism because countries may not have the necessary legal regime to regulate 
them, or other countries may not have the capability and expertise to detect their use for 
criminal purposes. It is not always easy to identify new payment methods.21 It bears noting 
that there is a legitimate market demand served by each of the new payment methods, but 
they may also be used to launder money.22 
This paper will focus on mobile payments only because they are the most widely used 
medium for business transactions in Malawi. It will look at the potential use of mobile 
payments by criminals as a vehicle for money laundering and terrorist financing as 
compared to the AML/CFT regulatory regime currently obtaining in Malawi. 
There are two types of mobile money payments.  With the one, all that is required is a 
phone as an access device to initiate and authenticate transactions from existing bank 
accounts or payment cards. The other payment is not based on an underlying bank or 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
  
21 FATF Typologies Report on Money Laundering Using New Payment Methods (October 2006) FATF-GAFI: 
Paris, available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/methodsandtrends/documents/moneylaunderingusingnewpaymentmethods.html, p5 
(Accessed on 12 March 2016). 
22FATF Typologies Report on Money Laundering Using New Payment Methods (October 2006) FATF-GAFI: 
Paris, available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/methodsandtrends/documents/moneylaunderingusingnewpaymentmethods.html, 
(Accessed on 12 March 2016). 
   
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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payment card account, but on the services of the telecommunications operator who, 
typically, acts as a payment intermediary to authorise, clear and settle the payment.23 The 
former is subject to the AML/CFT precautionary procedures of banks and is very easy to 
regulate because it is linked intrinsically to the general banking system, whereas the second 
one presents many ML/FT challenges because it is independent of the general banking 
system. For this reason this paper will focus on the second mobile money payment method. 
 In Malawi there are four mobile phone operator companies.24 Of these four, only two, 
namely, Airtel Malawi and Telecom Networks Malawi (TNM), provide mobile money 
payment products. Airtel has a product called Air Money and TNM has a product called 
Mpamba. Both these products enable people to pay for goods and services and also to 
transfer funds from one individual to another. All that is required to register an account and 
a particular product is a national identity card or passport and a personal phone number. 
One may apply for registration only in respect of one account.  The registration is done 
either through agents or at the operators’ service centres.25 
                                                          
23FATF Typologies Report on Money Laundering Using New Payment Methods (October 2006) FATF-GAFI: 
Paris, available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/methodsandtrends/documents/moneylaunderingusingnewpaymentmethods.html, p5 
(Accessed on 12 March 2016). 
24 Airtel Malawi, Telecom Networks Malawi (TNM), Access Malawi and Malawi Telecommunications Limited.  
25 Airtel Money Terms and Conditions, available at 
http://africa.airtel.com/wps/wcm/connect/AfricaRevamp/Malawi/Airtel_Money/Home/Personal/Terms-and-
Conditions, (Accessed on 31st March, 2016). See also Mpamba Terms and Conditions, available at 
http://www.tnm.co.mw/index.php/tnm-mpamba.html, (Accessed on 31 March, 2016). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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With these products, the two operators are offering a valuable service to the Malawian 
people, as only 27 per cent of the Malawian adult population is banked.26 This means that 
73 per cent of the adult Malawian population has no access to the formal banking system. 
The operators thus bring financial services to the multitude of unbanked adult Malawians. 
But, there are several challenges which may expose these wonderful products to the threat 
of being misused as vehicles of ML/TF. 
To begin with, Malawi does not have a national identity card for its citizenry.27 This makes it 
difficult to distinguish clearly who is a Malawian citizen and who is not. The situation is 
exacerbated by the fact that the majority of Malawians do not have birth certificates, or are 
not issued with them at birth, despite a clear legal provision that all births should be 
registered and that a birth certificate should be issued upon payment of a fee by the parents 
or guardians of the child.28 The law is applied laxly, hence the difficulty in establishing who 
are and who not Malawian citizens. In addition, there is no automated central biographical 
data centre where information about Malawian citizens is stored. Most of the information 
about the public is kept manually and is very scanty. This practical imperfection has been 
exploited fully by illegal immigrants who have managed to pass themselves off as bona fide 
Malawians. Some have managed even to obtain Malawian passports. 29  
                                                          
26  Mandiwa M ‘Access to Financial Services in Malawi: Policies and Challenges’, available at 
http://unctad.org/meetings/en/Presentation/ciem6_2014_Malawi_en.pdf p6 (Accessed on 10 April 2016). 
27 Nkhoma G B ‘Transnational Threats: The Problem of Illegal Immigration in Northern Malawi’ Southern 
African Peace and Security Studies 1(2) (2012) 36. 
28 Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Births and Deaths Registration Act (Chapter 24:01 of the Laws of Malawi) provide 
for registration of a child’s birth while section 16 of the same Act provides for the issuance of a birth certificate 
by the Registrar upon request and payment of the prescribed fee. 
29 Nkhoma G B (2012: 34). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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The illegal immigrants are often involved in money laundering, illegal foreign exchange 
businesses, drug trafficking and smuggling.30 
The other challenge is that some of the products do not require paper work and almost all 
the products do not require the disclosure of the purpose of the funds being transferred.31 
Furthermore, registration for these products is done mainly by agents, most of whom 
disregard that ‘know your customer’ (KYC) rule and the prerequisite customer due diligence 
(CDD) procedures that need to be complied with before entering into a financial transaction 
with a customer. These requirements are ignored for the sake of making a huge 
commission. 
Another challenge is that most financial institutions apply only generic AML/CFT measures. 
In its 2014 annual report, the Reserve Bank of Malawi found that financial institutions were 
falling short seriously in the following areas: 
a) Customer identification and verification processes; 
b) Record keeping of client information; 
c) Ongoing monitoring of customer transactions; 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
30 Nkhoma G B (2012: 36). See also FATF Mutual Evaluation Report on Malawi (2008), available at 
http://www.esaamlg.org/evaluationreports/Malawi_Report.pdf in which it was indicated that Malawi faces a 
big challenge in as far as production and trade of Indian hemp is concerned and that very little is known about 
the proceeds generated or laundered from this trade (Accessed on 16 April 2016). 
 
31 Airtel Money Cross Boarder Transfer, available at 
http://africa.airtel.com/wps/wcm/connect/AfricaRevamp/malawi/airtel_money/home/airtel-money-cross-
border, (Accessed on 16 April 2016).  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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d) ML/TF risk assessment of customers, products and services, delivery methods and 
geographical locations. 
The Central Bank also noted that financial institutions conduct limited and generic AML/CFT 
staff training that does not cover all legislative requirements and specialised business 
areas.32 This is very worrying, considering the fact that one of the mobile phone operators 
offers a mobile money payment product that allows for cross-border transfer of money 
from one individual to another. 
It is in the light of the above-mentioned challenges that this research paper aims to assess 
the vulnerability of mobile money payment systems to abuse as vehicles of ML/TF in the 
Malawian context. 
1.4 Theoretical Premise of the Study 
The research paper aims to examine the degree to which the mobile money payment 
products offered by Malawian mobile service providers can be exploited by criminal 
enterprises as vehicles for money laundering and terrorist financing. It proceeds on the 
theoretical premise that criminals will use the perfectly legal mobile money payment 
products which serve a legitimate market demand in order to give legitimacy to the 
proceeds of their criminal activities. The author assumes that criminals will be attracted to 
these products because they are legal and are not regulated thoroughly by the authorities. 
It is also the author’s assumption that the challenges of positive identification and other 
loopholes, such as anonymity, currently plaguing the mobile money payment products 
                                                          
32 Reserve Bank of Malawi‘Financial Institutions Supervision Annual Report (2014)’, available at 
https://www.rbm.mw/Supervision/BankSupervision/?activeTab=BASUDirectivesandGuidelines, (Accessed on 
16 April 2016). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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which have been highlighted above will serve as an extra incentive to criminals to use them 
in order to integrate their ill-gotten gains into the formal economy. These are novel 
products whose susceptibility to misuse as vehicles for ML/TF has been brought to the 
attention of the authorities only through the research conducted by entities such as the 
FATF, ESAAMLG, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
1.5 Research Question 
The question which this research paper aims to address is whether or not the mobile money 
payment products offered by the Malawian mobile phone service providers to Malawians 
can be misused by criminals as vehicles for ML/TF when compared to the traditional 
AML/CFT regulatory regime currently operational in the country. 
1.6 Research Methodology 
This paper will be a desktop-based research project. It will make use of primary and 
secondary sources such as laws, supervisory directives, international instruments, cases, 
case studies, academic articles and books in a quest to find the answer to the research 
question. The paper will give a picture of the extent to which mobile money payments in 
Malawi are vulnerable to be exploited for ML/TF. Since money laundering is a global 
phenomenon, the paper will seek guidance from the approaches adopted by other 
jurisdictions in so far as mitigating the risk of mobile money payments being used as 
vehicles for money laundering is concerned. 
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1.7 Conclusion 
The chapter is a cursory description of the flaws in the mobile money payment systems that 
have necessitated the need to conduct this study in order to establish the extent to which 
they can be exploited for ML/TF by criminal elements.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
14 
 
Chapter Two 
The International Legal Framework on Combating Money Laundering Through Mobile 
Money Payments 
2.1 Introduction 
Ever since money laundering was identified as a scourge posing a serious threat to the well-
being of the global financial system, the global community has concentrated its efforts to 
devise a legal regime aimed at combating and mitigating the negative effects of money 
laundering. This chapter will discuss the international legal regime that has been developed 
to combat the use of mobile money payments as vehicles for money laundering. It will trace 
the origin of the global fight against the scourge of money laundering to the present, 
highlighting specific legal instruments that address the use of mobile money payments as 
vehicles for money laundering. The first part of the chapter will discuss the money 
laundering legal regime put in place through the efforts of the United Nations (UN). There 
are three money laundering international legal instruments which came into existence 
because of the concerted efforts of the UN. These are the UN Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (the Vienna Convention), the 
UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime of 2000 (the Palermo Convention), 
and the UN Convention against Corruption of 2003 (the Merida Convention). 
After discussing the UN legal instruments, this chapter will move on to examine and discuss 
the initiatives of the European Union (EU) in the fight against money laundering in general 
and in so far as they relate to mobile money payments in particular. These include the 
Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of Proceeds 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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from Crime (CoE Convention of 1990), and the first, second, third and fourth Council 
Directives on Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money 
Laundering. 
The last part of the chapter will look at the standards and guidelines propounded by the 
FATF. The focus will fall on the specific FATF Recommendations which address the 
intersection between money laundering and mobile money payments. 
2.2 The United Nations Anti-Money Laundering Legal Instruments 
The UN is a major player in the global fight against the phenomenon of money laundering. 
To date, it has adopted three conventions dealing with the crime of money laundering. 
These conventions, in the order of their adoption, are the Vienna Convention (1988), the 
Palermo Convention (2000) and the Merida Convention (2003). 
2.2.1 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
(The Vienna Convention, 1988) 
This Convention was the first international legal instrument to address the problem of 
money laundering. However, it is limited in its scope of application because it deals only 
with drug-related money laundering and not any other serious offences.33 
The Convention places an obligation on states parties to see to it that they ‘criminalise drug-
related money laundering with the scope of criminalisation covering a comprehensive list 
                                                          
33 Article 3(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention. 
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connected to drug trafficking; from production, cultivation and possession to the 
organisation, management and financing of trafficking operations’.34 
The Convention also obligates states parties to adopt laws in their domestic legislation 
which empower competent authorities to confiscate and seize proceeds from drug-related 
crimes and tainted property.35  
In addition, the Vienna Convention encourages states parties to co-operate in the fight 
against money laundering. This encouragement of co-operation is two-fold. Firstly, states 
parties are called upon to enter into bilateral and multilateral treaties, agreements or 
arrangements in order to enhance the efficacy of international co-operation.36 Secondly, the 
Convention obligates states parties to accord each other mutual legal assistance (MLA) in 
order to smoothen and expedite the investigation and prosecution of money laundering 
offences and also seizure and confiscation proceedings.37 
One of the outstanding features of the Vienna Convention which has enhanced the fight 
against money laundering, is the obligation on states to enact legislation which empowers 
courts to override bank secrecy laws.38 This has enabled law enforcement agencies to carry 
out their investigations without obstacles. 
 
 
                                                          
34 Stewart D P ‘Internationalising the War on Drugs: The UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances’  Denver Journal of Law and Policies (1990) 387. 
35 Article 5 of the Vienna Convention. 
36 Article 5(4) (g) of the Vienna Convention. 
37 Article 7 of the Vienna Convention. 
38 Article 5(3) of the Vienna Convention. 
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2.2.2 UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (The Palermo Convention, 
2000) 
The Palermo Convention was adopted by the UN General Assembly, by way of resolution 
A/RES/55/25 of 15 November 2000 and came into force on 11 November 2003.39 This 
Convention is of great significance because it is the first legally binding UN instrument 
dealing with transnational organised crime and other serious crimes.40 Unlike the Vienna 
Convention which limited predicate offences to drug-related crimes, the Palermo 
Convention broadened the range of predicate offences for money laundering. It extended 
them beyond drug-related offences to other serious offences.41 States parties to the 
Convention are under an obligation to extend the criminalisation of money laundering to 
other predicate offences such as participation in organised crime, corruption and 
obstruction of justice.42 
The Palermo Convention provides also for identification, tracing, freezing, seizure and 
confiscation of proceeds of crime.43 
The Palermo Convention, too, contains some provisions which are very relevant to the focus 
topic of this paper. These provisions call for the regulation of banks, non-financial 
institutions, and where appropriate, other bodies which are deemed to be particularly 
predisposed to money laundering.44 These provisions apply to mobile money payments by 
extension. By their nature, the latter do not fall within the ambit of the traditional financial 
                                                          
39 UN website www.un.org/en/documents/ (Accessed on 23 August 2016). 
40 Hopton D Money Laundering: A Concise Guide for all Businesses (2009) (2 ed) 10. 
41 Hopton (2009: 10). See also Article 6 of the Palermo Convention. 
42 Article 6(1) (a) and (b) of the Palermo Convention. 
43 Article 12 of the Palermo Convention. 
44 Article 7(1)(a) of the Palermo Convention. 
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system. As such, they can fall under the category of non-financial institutions or bodies 
particularly susceptible to money laundering. The traditional financial institutions, especially 
banks, have been heavily regulated ever since the global fight against money laundering 
began. Consequently, criminals have had to find new ways to launder their ill-gotten gains. 
One such avenue is through mobile money payments. Although article 7(1)(a) does not 
specifically mention mobile money, it is clear, as demonstrated above, that it covers such 
payments. 
2.2.3 UN Convention against Corruption (The Merida Convention, 2003) 
The Merida Convention is the only legally binding anti-corruption instrument whose scope 
of application is global.45 It is the most comprehensive anti-corruption legal instrument. 46 
Despite being dedicated substantially to the fight against corruption, the Merida Convention 
deals also with the issue of money laundering. Of significance to this paper is article 14 of 
the Convention. The article calls upon states parties to formulate a comprehensive 
regulatory and supervisory regime capable of deterring and detecting all forms of money 
laundering.47 The subjects to be regulated and supervised by this comprehensive regime 
include banks, non-financial institutions, legal and non-legal persons that provide formal or 
informal services for transmission of money or value, and other bodies susceptible to money 
laundering.48 The methods to be employed to deter and detect money laundering include 
                                                          
45 Babu R R ‘The United Nations Convention against Corruption: A Critical Overview’ 6, available at 
http://ssrn.co/abstract=891898 (accessed on 11th September 2016). 
46 Carr I and Goldby M ‘The UN Anti-Corruption Convention and Money Laundering Working Paper’, available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1409628 (accessed on 11 September 2016). 
47 Article 14(1)(a) of the Merida Convention. 
48 Article 14(1)(a) of the Merida Convention. 
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identification of beneficial owners, record keeping and reporting of suspicious 
transactions.49  
Article 14 also requires states parties, where possible, to require financial institutions, 
including money remitters, to demand information on the origin of funds and persons 
involved in electronic funds transfer transactions. This information must be meaningful and 
accurate, and must be maintained throughout the payment chain.50 If an electronic funds 
transfer transaction lacks the two preceding preconditions then it should be subjected to 
close scrutiny by the financial institution or money remitters.51 
As pointed out above, article 14 has a close bearing on the issue of mobile money payments. 
It calls on states parties to design a regulatory and supervisory regime to deter and detect 
all forms of money laundering, not only in relation to banks but also in relation to other non-
financial institutions, including those engaged in formal and informal transmission of money 
or value. Thus, mobile money payments service providers are included because they are 
involved in the transfer of money or value. To remove doubt, the comprehensive regime has 
been extended to any other bodies susceptible to money laundering. Mobile money 
payments service providers can also be slotted under this category.  Article 14 also makes a 
specific reference to electronic funds transfers, of which mobile money payments are part. 
It emphasises the need to have information on the origin of funds and the need for 
application of close scrutiny to transactions which are devoid of adequate originator 
information. All this regulation could go a long way in detecting money laundering and 
                                                          
49 Article 14(1)(a) of the Merida Convention. 
50 Article 14(3) (a) and (b) of the Merida Convention. 
51 Article 14(3)(c) of the Merida Convention. 
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preventing mobile money payments from being utilised as vehicles for money laundering if 
effectively implemented.  
2.3 European Union Conventions and Directives on Money Laundering 
As part of the global fight on money laundering and terrorist financing, the European Union 
has adopted several legal instruments which are binding on its member states. These 
instruments include the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and the four European Union Directives on the 
Prevention of the use of Financial Systems for the Purpose of Money Laundering. The fourth 
Directive was adopted recently in 2015.  
2.3.1 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of 
the Proceeds from Crime (CoE Convention, 1990) 
The purpose of the adoption of this particular Convention is very clear from the wording of 
its preamble. The aim was to provide for a uniform legal regime amongst member states of 
the EU in their collective efforts to fight and combat money laundering. Part of the 
preamble asserts that the Convention was adopted with the aim of achieving a greater unity 
among members of the EU by pursuing a common ‘criminal policy aimed at the protection 
of society’.52 
 
                                                          
52 Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Preamble to the CoE Convention 
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These sentiments are shared by Mugarura who writes that the aim of adopting the 
Convention was to synchronize anti-money laundering practices and policies within the 
EU.53 
Apart from harmonising the anti-money laundering legal regime within the member states 
of the EU, the CoE Convention also stresses the need for international co-operation in the 
fight against money laundering.54 This theme is reiterated in articles 7 and 8 of the CoE 
Convention. These articles call upon member states to accord each other co-operation to 
the widest extent possible during investigations, tracing and confiscation of proceeds, 
instrumentalities and other property which has been found to be liable for confiscation.55 
Articles 2 and 3 of the CoE Convention requires states parties to adopt laws and measures 
which will enable competent authorities and law enforcement agencies to identify and 
confiscate proceeds of crimes and instrumentalities so as to make it easier to deny  
criminals enjoying the fruits of their criminal enterprise.56 
In addition, the CoE Convention criminalises various money laundering offences.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
53 Mugarura  The Global Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Landscape in Less Developed Countries (2012) 71. 
54 Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Preamble to the CoE Convention. 
55 Articles 7 and 8 of the CoE Convention. 
56 Articles 2 and 3 of the CoE Convention. 
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2.3.2 First EU Directive on Money Laundering: Council Directive 91/308 ECC on 
Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering 
This is the first of a series of Directives issued by the CoE on combating money laundering. It 
was adopted in 1991.57 This Directive asserted that combating money laundering using 
penal sanctions alone, as advocated by the Vienna Convention and the CoE Convention, was 
not enough. It championed the view that penal sanctions should not be the only tool in the 
quest to fight and prevent money laundering.58 
Under this First Directive, states parties were obligated to adopt measures that reflect the 
international character of money laundering for them to be effective in the fight against it. 
Moreover, it was recognised under this Directive that money laundering is not confined to 
being perpetrated only within credit and financial institutions such as banks, but can also 
take place through other avenues, including some other professions. States parties were 
thus called upon to extend measures aimed at combating and preventing money laundering 
to such professions and categories of undertakings that are susceptible to being used for 
money laundering purposes.59 Arguably, this includes mobile money payments since they 
are a system which is prone to abuse for money laundering by criminals. The mobile 
payment system is attractive to criminals since most states have not considered it to be 
seriously vulnerable to money laundering. 
                                                          
57 Ionescu L ‘Money Laundering Directives and Corruption in the European Union’, Contemporary Readings in 
Law and Social Justice Volume 4(2)(2012)562. 
58 Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Preamble to the First EU Directive on Money Laundering. See also Article 12 of the 
First Directive.  
59 Paragraph 22 of the Preamble to the First EU Directive on Money Laundering. 
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2.3.3 Second EU Directive on Money Laundering: Directive 2001/97 EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 4 December 2001 Amending Council Directive 91/308 ECC 
on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money 
Laundering. 
 The second Directive was adopted in 2001 and was aimed at amending the first Directive.60 
It introduced significant changes in two critical aspects of the fight against money 
laundering. Firstly, it extended the application of the Directive to all non-financial activities 
and professions, such as lawyers and notaries.61 The application of the Directive was also 
extended to cover currency exchanges, money remittance offices62 and investment firms.63 
Secondly, the second Directive extends the range of predicate offences from drug-trafficking 
to include all other serious crimes, in keeping with the broader definition of money 
laundering as advocated by the FATF.64 
Lastly, the Second Directive recognised that the strict regulation of the formal financial 
system had made it difficult for potential money launderers to abuse it for their nefarious 
schemes. This led economic criminals to devise other avenues to launder the proceeds of 
their criminal enterprises. The Directive, therefore, called upon states parties to extend the 
obligations imposed by the Directive, such as customer identification and record keeping, to 
those activities and professions that are particularly vulnerable to money laundering.65 For 
the purposes of this paper, it is arguable that activities that are particularly prone to money 
                                                          
60 Ionescu L (2012: 562). 
61 Ionescu L (2012: 562). 
62 Ionescu L (2012: 562). 
63 Paragraph 5 of the Preamble to the Second EU Directive on Money Laundering. 
64 Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Preamble to the Second EU Directive. See also Ionescu L (2012: 562). 
65 Paragraphs 14 and 15 of the Preamble to the Second EU Directive. 
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laundering include mobile money payments, since they represent a system that can be 
easily abused by criminals for money laundering purposes, given that it is not properly 
regulated by the relevant authorities. That mobile money payments are prone to be abused 
for money laundering purposes is supported by the FATF’s typology on New Payment 
Methods.66 
2.3.4 Third EU Directive on Money laundering: Council Directive 2005/60/EC on the 
Prevention of the Use of the financial System for the Purposes of Money Laundering and 
Terrorist Financing.  
This Directive was adopted on the 26 October 2005.67 Its aim was to make the EU’s anti-
money laundering regime dovetail with international anti-money laundering practices. This 
was necessitated by the review of the FATF standards which took place in 2003.68  
A need thus arose to make the obligations under the Directive to reflect the changes made 
by the 2003 review of the FATF standards.69 
The third Directive represents a major paradigm shift in the global fight to preserve the 
integrity of the financial system in that it extended its obligations to the fight against 
terrorist financing. This is reflected in paragraph 8 of the preamble to the Directive which 
states firmly that the previous obligations it imposed should be extended to cover the 
collection of money or property used for terrorist purposes. The reason was that the misuse 
of the financial system as a conduit for the transfer of criminal or clean money for terrorist 
purposes is detrimental to the integrity, the proper functioning, and the reputation of the 
                                                          
66 New Payment Methods, available at www.fatf-gafi.org/  (Accessed on 20 September 2016). 
67 Ionescu L (2012: 563). 
68 Paragraph 5 of the Preamble to the Third EU Directive on Money Laundering. See also Ionescu L (2012: 563). 
69 Paragraph 5 of the Preamble to the Third EU Directive on Money Laundering. 
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financial system.70 This is a relevant factor to this study because clean or criminal money can 
be transferred through the financial system for terrorist purposes using mobile money 
payments. 
In addition, this Directive provides for the need to have thorough and effective ways of 
conducting customer identification procedures which, as the Directive identified, are a 
crucial aspect in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.71 This 
encompasses the identification of beneficial owners72 which, according to Article 3(6) of the 
Directive, include corporate entities.73 In the light of the fact that registered companies are 
able to utilise mobile money payments to make payments or send and receive money in 
Malawi, this Directive is of great guidance to what mobile money payments service 
providers should do in order to establish with whom they are doing business. Knowledge of 
their customers would minimise the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing. 
Furthermore, this Directive obligates institutions and persons covered by it to focus their 
efforts on combating money laundering and terrorist financing where the risk is great. This 
is called the risk-based approach.74 
 
 
 
                                                          
70 Paragraph 8 of the Preamble to the Third EU Directive on Money Laundering. 
71 Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Preamble to the Third EU Directive on Money Laundering.  
72 Paragraphs 9 and 10  of the Preamble to the Third EU Directive on Money Laundering. 
73 Article 3(6) of the Third EU Directive on Money Laundering.  
74 Paragraph 22 of the Third EU Directive on Money Laundering. 
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2.3.5 The Fourth EU Directive on Money Laundering: Council Directive (EU) 2015/849 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the Prevention of the Use 
of the Financial System for the Purposes of Money Laundering or Terrorist Financing, 
Amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
And Repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
Commission Directive 2006/70/EC 
This fourth Directive was adopted in May 2015. It recognised the susceptibility of financial 
technological innovations to exploitation by criminals for money laundering, terrorist 
financing and proliferation purposes.75 It thus obligates states parties to draft legislation 
that tackles the danger of technological innovations being misused by money launderers to 
destabilise the financial system. It calls upon competent authorities to be proactive in 
combating new and innovative ways of money laundering.76 
In addition, this Directive acknowledges the substantial increase in the use of electronic 
money products by consumers as substitutes for bank accounts.77 It goes on to state that 
this justifies subjecting these products to anti-money laundering and anti-financing of 
terrorism measures.78 However, the Directive goes on to state that where there is low risk 
of money laundering or terrorist financing, such products should be exempt from strict 
AML/CFT obligations. Such exemptions would include situations where the products are 
utilised solely for purchasing goods and services. 79 
                                                          
75 Paragraph 19 of the Preamble to the Fourth EU Directive on Money Laundering. 
76 Paragraph 19 of the Preamble to the Fourth EU Directive on Money Laundering. 
77 Paragraph 7 of the Preamble to the Fourth EU Directive on Money Laundering.  
78 Paragraph 7 of the Preamble to the Fourth EU Directive on Money Laundering. 
79 Paragraph 7 of the Preamble to the Fourth EU Directive on Money Laundering. 
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2.4 The FATF International Standards for Combating of Money Laundering and the 
Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
The FATF is an inter-governmental body set up by members of the G8 to develop standards 
to be used in the global fight against money laundering.80 The first FATF standards were 
issued in 1990.81 Then, the standards addressed only the issue of money laundering and not 
terrorist financing. The standards have since been reviewed four times,82 first in 1996, and 
the second time in 2001. This latter review was necessitated by the terrorist attack of the 
Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001.83 This review added 9 more 
recommendations to the FATF standards, addressing the issue of terrorism and terrorist 
financing. The standards came to be known as the 40+9 Recommendations.84  The next 
review of the FATF standards took place in 2003.85 The last review occurred in 2012. In this 
review the Recommendations were amalgamated into one set of standards. They are no 
longer called the 40+9 Recommendations. Currently there are just 40 Recommendations. In 
addition, the issue of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was addressed. The 
standards are now called the FATF international standards on money laundering, terrorist 
financing and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.86  
The FATF standards provide a blueprint of the global legal regime in the fight against money 
laundering and terrorist financing. They are acknowledged as the global anti-money 
                                                          
80 FATF website, available at www.fatf-gafi.org/about/ (Accessed on 23 August 2016).  
81 FATF website. 
82 FATF website. 
83 Gill M and Taylor G ‘Preventing Money laundering or Obstructing Business?’ British Journal of Criminology 
(2004) 584. 
84 Gill M and Taylor G (2004). 
85 FATF website. 
86 FATF Standards. 
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laundering and counter-terrorist financing standard.87 Almost all international instruments 
on the subject are modeled on the FATF standards. For example, all the Directives issued by 
the EU on money laundering have been adopted in order to be in conformity with the FATF 
standards. The First EU Directive on money laundering was adopted in order for the EU legal 
regime on money laundering to conform to the first set of FATF standards which were 
issued in 1990.88 Subsequent EU Directives on money laundering have been issued and 
adopted in order to conform to the FATF standards as they have been reviewed from time 
to time over the years. 
As they currently stand, the FATF standards provide guidance to supervisory, regulatory and 
law enforcement agencies of states around the world on key issues to be addressed in the 
global fight against money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. 
Firstly, the standards call upon countries to tackle money laundering on a risk-based 
approach. This is based on the fact that not all risks in the financial system are the same. 
Therefore, states and responsible institutions should allocate the most resources only to 
situations and products that present the highest risk of money laundering and terrorist 
financing.89 
Secondly, the standards specifically tackle the issues of terrorism, terrorist financing and 
non-proliferation in Recommendations 5, 6, 7 and 8. Recommendation 5 calls upon 
countries to criminalise terrorist financing in line with their obligations under the Terrorist 
Financing Convention. Recommendation 6 implores countries to impose targeted financial 
                                                          
87 FATF website. 
88 Paragraph 11 of the Preamble to the First EU Directive on Money Laundering. 
89 Recommendation 1. 
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sanctions which comply with the contents of United Nations Security Council resolutions 
which address the issues of prevention and suppression of terrorism and terrorist financing. 
Recommendation 7 calls upon countries to consider implementing targeted financial 
sanctions to comply with UN resolutions on the prevention and suppression of proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction, and Recommendation 8 asks countries to enact laws that 
prevent charitable organizations that being abused for terrorist financing purposes and to 
review the adequacy of such laws.  
Thirdly, the standards call upon states and players in the financial system to identify people 
with whom they do business, both at the inception and during the subsistence of the 
business relationship.90 This helps to identify possible occurrences of money laundering. The 
customer information has to be verified independently by the financial institutions in order 
to ensure its credibility.91 The records of transactions between financial service providers 
and their clients have to be kept for a period of 5 years.92 
In addition, financial institutions and other professionals and service providers which are 
susceptible to money laundering and terrorist financing threats are required to report to 
competent authorities all suspicious transactions and transactions that exceed maximum 
thresholds.93  
                                                          
90 Recommendation 10 of the FATF Standards. 
91 Recommendation 10. 
92 Recommendation 11. 
93 Recommendation 20. 
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Furthermore, when a suspicious transaction is filed with the Financial Intelligence Unit in 
respect of a customer, it is prohibited to warn him or her that the transaction has been 
reported to the FIU.  This is called the rule against tipping-off.94  
The fourth EU Directive addresses also issues bearing on the electronic transfer of money 
and innovative ways of transferring money or value. Recommendation 14 addresses the 
issue of money or value transfer services. It calls upon countries to ensure the registration 
and licensing of natural or legal persons that provide these services. Countries are also 
called upon to subject money or value transfer service to effective monitoring systems and 
ensure that they follow the FATF Recommendations to the letter. Recommendation 16 
provides for the regulation of wire transfers. It suggests that all relevant information 
including originator and beneficiary information of such transfers should be required and be 
retained throughout the payment chain. 
Of particular relevance to this paper is Recommendation 15, which calls upon countries and 
financial institutions to ‘identify and assess the money laundering and financing of terrorism 
risks’ associated with new products, new delivery mechanisms, new business practices and 
new technologies. This includes mobile money payments. They represent a new financial 
product which utilizes new technological mechanisms. Both these traits make them 
attractive to criminals for money laundering and terrorist financing purposes. Thus, all the 
obligations that have been imposed on other actors in the financial system have to apply 
also to mobile money payments service providers. 
                                                          
94 Recommendation 21. 
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Apart from setting the standards on money laundering and terrorist financing, the FATF also 
conducts research studies to identify new ways in which money is being laundered. These 
are called money laundering typologies. In 2006, the FATF conducted a typology on the 
susceptibility of new payment methods to money laundering.95 This typology report was 
followed by the 2010 report called Money Laundering Using New Payment Methods (NPMs). 
It analysed three types of NPMs. These are prepaid cards, Internet payment services and 
mobile payment services. This follow-up typology report was necessitated by the growing 
use of NPMs and an increased awareness of associated money laundering and terrorist 
financing risks.96 
Of particular relevance to this paper are the mobile payment services.  
2.5 Conclusion 
As can be seen from the discussion above, the global legal regime aimed at combating 
money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has 
evolved rapidly over the years. At the inception of this global fight, the focus was on 
combating the laundering of the proceeds of the drug-trafficking trade. This is exemplified 
by the provisions of the 1988 Vienna Convention. Later, the authorities realised that there 
were proceeds from other criminal activities which were being laundered using the global 
financial system. Hence, a need arose to expand the predicate offences for money 
laundering. Thus, all serious offences were included in the list of predicate offences for the 
crime of money laundering.  
                                                          
95 FATF typology on Money Laundering Using New Payment Methods, (October, 2010). 
96 Executive Summary (2010). 
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The attacks on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in September 
2011 alerted world authorities to the need to monitor the financial system so as to prevent 
and combat terrorist financing. The fight against money laundering and terrorist financing 
thus became one. Later, this would be extended to the fight against proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. 
The global financial system has become so heavily regulated that it has become risky for 
criminal elements to use it for money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation 
without detection by regulatory, supervisory and law enforcement agencies. This has forced 
criminals to look to other means of laundering the proceeds their crimes, financing 
terrorism and sponsoring the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. One such new 
medium which has the potential of affording criminals an opportunity to achieve the above 
without strict scrutiny is mobile money payments. This was unearthed by the FATF’s 2006 
and 2010 typology reports on NPMs. 
The FATF standards have addressed the vulnerability of NPMs to money laundering, 
terrorist financing and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by way of 
Recommendations 14, 15 and 16. The FATF provides merely a guide on the measures to be 
implemented, and it is up to individual countries to decide exactly how they are going to 
implement such recommendations. 
The next chapter will look at how the mobile money payments are regulated under 
Malawian law. It will compare also how they are regulated in other jurisdictions such as 
Kenya. It will also discuss and pinpoint the vulnerability of these products to misuse for 
money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
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Chapter Three 
The Legal Regime Regulating Mobile Money Payments in Malawi 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will discuss the various pieces of legislation which regulate mobile money 
payments and the AML/CFT laws that touch on mobile money payments in Malawi. 
Furthermore, it will discuss the relevant authorities that have been tasked with the job of 
supervising and regulating mobile money payments and the role each plays. The chapter will 
consider also the vulnerability of mobile money payments to money laundering and terrorist 
financing due to the enforcement deficit and gaps in the AML/CFT with regard to mobile 
money payments. The chapter will compare how mobile money payments services in other 
jurisdictions, for example Kenya, are regulated and how the responsible authorities in those 
jurisdictions have handled the threat of such services being utilised for money laundering 
and terrorist financing purposes. In addition the chapter will engage the need to strike a 
balance between the regulation of mobile money payments to reduce their susceptibility to 
money laundering and financial inclusion of the masses who are underserved by the formal 
financial system. Lastly, the chapter will examine the extent to which the responsible 
authorities responsible for supervising and regulating mobile money payments adhere to 
international AML/CFT standards in the execution of their functions. 
As discussed above, Malawi was affected by a financial scam in 2013, which led to the loss 
of 13 Billion Kwacha from the state coffers. Since then, several people have been convicted 
of laundering the proceeds emanating from that scam. This means that Malawian courts 
have dealt only with money laundering cases involving the proceeds of corruption and 
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public theft laundered through the formal financial system. They have not dealt with a case 
of proceeds laundered through mobile money payments. Be that as it may, it does not 
eliminate the fact that mobile money payments can be abused by criminals to launder 
money. As of 2014-15, it was estimated that 10 per cent of Malawian mobile phone 
subscribers were registered customers of mobile money accounts.97 This percentage 
translated into 0.4-0.5 million mobile money account holders, an estimated figure which 
was projected to grow considerably owing to the partnerships which the mobile money 
payments service providers were forging with banks and micro finance institutions (MFI).98 
The potential of mobile money presenting a lucrative opportunity to criminals to launder 
the proceeds of their criminal enterprises is addressed below. 
3.2 Laws and Institutions Regulating Mobile Money Payments in Malawi 
There are several pieces of legislation that have a bearing on the functioning of mobile 
money payments in Malawi. These include the Money Laundering, Proceeds of Serious 
Crime and Terrorist Financing Act (Money Laundering Act, 2006)99 and the regulations made 
pursuant to that Act (AML Regulations, 2011),100 the Reserve Bank of Malawi Act,101 the 
Mobile Money Guidelines issued by RBM pursuant to section 4(e) of the RBM Act, the 
Financial Services Act102 and the Communications Act. 
In addition to the above-mentioned enactments, there are several authorities that provide 
supervisory and regulatory services for mobile money payments in Malawi. These include 
                                                          
97 Buckley R, Greenacre J and Malady L ‘The Regulation of Mobile Money in Malawi’ Washington University 
Global Studies Law Review 14(3) (2015) 451. 
98 Buckley et al (2015: 450). 
99 Chapter 8:07 of the Laws of Malawi. 
100 Money Laundering, Proceeds of Serious Crime and Terrorist Financing Regulations, 2011. 
101 Chapter 44:02 of the Laws of Malawi. 
102 Act No. 26 of 2010 of the Laws of Malawi. 
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the Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority (MACRA), the Reserve Bank of Malawi 
(RBM) and the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). The RBM is the primary regulator of mobile 
money payments in Malawi.103 
3.2.1 The Money Laundering, Proceeds of Serious Crime and Terrorist Financing Act and 
the Regulations Pursuant to that Act 
 This Act is the main law dealing with anti-money laundering and the combating of the 
financing of terrorism. Part of the objectives of this Act is obligate financial institutions to 
adopt measures aimed at combating money laundering and terrorist financing.104  The 
obligations under this Act apply also to mobile money payments since they are included in 
the definition of financial institutions covered by the Act. Mobile money payments are 
defined as financial transactions under the category of money transmission services.105 
Arguably, they are also covered under the category of institutions issuing and administering 
means of payment.106 
The Act replicates the key FATF Recommendations on anti-money laundering and counter-
financing of terrorism. Firstly, the Act obligates financial institutions, including mobile 
money payments service providers, to ascertain and verify independently the identity of the 
customers with whom they enter into a business relationship, conduct a transaction or 
suspect of engaging in money laundering. The identification need not only be done prior to 
the inception of the business relationship, but also during the relationship.107 This 
requirement enables financial institutions to know exactly the type of person, legal or 
                                                          
103 Buckley et al (2015: 451). 
104 Long title of the Money Laundering Act. 
105 Section 2 of the Money Laundering Act. 
106 Section 2 of the Money Laundering Act. 
107 Section 24(1) of the Money Laundering Act. 
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natural, with whom they are entering into a business relationship so as to be able to 
determine whether or not such person poses a money laundering or terrorist financing risk. 
Secondly, financial institutions are obligated to report to the FIU and not to proceed with 
processing an attempted transaction where insufficient evidence has been adduced to 
establish a satisfactory identification of a customer.108 Failure to comply with this 
requirement results in the commission of an offence under the Act, the punishment of 
which  is two years’ imprisonment  and a fine of K100, 000 in the case of a natural person 
and a K500,000 fine and loss of a business licence in the case of a company.109 
The Act also requires financial institutions to maintain accounts in the clients’ true names.110 
Thus, they are prohibited from establishing and maintaining anonymous accounts or 
accounts in the fictitious names of their clients. 
In addition, the Act compels financial institutions to establish and maintain customer 
records which should include such information as the customer’s identity, transactions 
conducted and their accompanying correspondence, as well as enquiries  made to the FIU 
relating to suspicious transactions and money laundering and terrorist financing in respect 
of such customer.111 This helps financial institutions to construct a customer profile for their 
clients which is not only helpful in assessing the ML/TF risk of a client, but which assists law 
enforcement authorities as an evidentiary source should the need to investigate and 
prosecute arise. 
                                                          
108 Section 25(2) of the Money Laundering Act. 
109 Section 25(2) of the Money Laundering Act. 
110 Section 26 of the Money Laundering Act. 
111 Section 27 of the Money Laundering Act. 
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Section 28 of the Money Laundering Act imposes perhaps one of the most crucial 
obligations in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing on financial 
institutions. It obligates them to report suspicious transactions to the FIU whenever they 
suspect that a transaction exceeds the designated threshold or suspect that it involves the 
commission of a money laundering offence. This enables the FIU to analyse such 
transactions, and if they establish any irregularity, transmit such intelligence to law 
enforcement or supervisory authorities for investigation or prosecution.112 Whenever a 
suspicious transaction report (STR) is filed with the FIU by a financial institution, such 
institution or its personnel are prohibited from notifying the person against whom an STR 
has been filed that it has been filed.113 Contravention of this obligation is an offence under 
the Act. 
Moreover, the Act requires financial institutions to establish and maintain internal reporting 
procedures. These include employing a compliance officer, setting up mechanisms for 
conducting CDD and KYC requirements, keeping and retaining transaction records, reporting 
STRs and acquainting employees with AML/CFT laws and regulations.114 
The Act requires financial institutions and money transmission service providers to record 
also originator information and other related messages on all electronic funds transfers.115  
This helps in establishing the true identity of the person initiating the transaction and its 
purpose. 
                                                          
112 Section 11(2) of the Money Laundering Act. The FIU is established under section 11(1) of the Money 
Laundering Act and is ‘responsible for receiving, requesting, analysing and disseminating to competent 
authorities disclosures of financial information as required under this Act, in order to counter money 
laundering and financing of terrorism’. 
113 Section 30 of the Money Laundering Act. 
114 Section 32 of the Money Laundering Act. 
115 Section 33 of the Money Laundering Act. 
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Lastly, the Act empowers the FIU to obtain court orders to enforce financial institutions’ 
compliance with obligations imposed under sections 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28 whenever it is of 
the view that the obligations have been breached.116  Such court orders are crucial as they 
are an effective manner of ensuring that the AML/CFT obligations are enforced. 
Most of the obligations imposed by the Money Laundering Act are replicated in the AML 
Regulations of 2011 except that the Regulations provide specific details and clarification on 
how financial institutions should go about implementing the obligations punctiliously.117 
3.2.2 The Reserve Bank of Malawi Act (RBM Act) 
The Reserve Bank of Malawi is the central bank of the land tasked with the function of 
regulating commercial banks and overseeing the financial and monetary policies of 
Malawi.118 It is established under section of 3 the RBM Act.  
The RBM is one of the main actors in the regulation of mobile money payments in Malawi. It 
is obligated to promote excellent co-operation with banks and other financial institutions in 
order to guarantee high standards of conduct in the financial system and the proper 
implementation of policies of national interest.119 Its mandate is to ensure that financial 
institutions such as mobile money payments service providers offer their services with the 
highest standards of financial integrity so as to safeguard the financial system, and in the 
spirit of the national interest, to make sure that their products are not used for money 
laundering and terrorist financing. In trying to fulfil this mandate, the RBM has led efforts to 
                                                          
116 Section 43 of the Money Laundering Act. 
117 ESAAMLG '4th Progress Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism 
Republic of Malawi’ 20, available at www.esaamlg.org, (Accessed on 20 December 2016).  
118 Section 4of the RBM Act. 
119 Section 47(b) and (c) of the RBM Act. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
39 
 
bring together participants and regulators in the mobile money payments service industry 
under the banner of the Mobile Money Consultative Group (MMCG).120 
In addition, the RBM is tasked with the obligation to supervise banks and other financial 
institutions. Thus, it has to make sure that they are solvent and act in accordance with 
monetary regulations under the RBM Act.121 The MMCG is comprised of the two Mobile 
Network Operators in Malawi, donors, regulators and banks, and its main objective is to 
fortify the use of mobile money payments in Malawi by heeding the recommendations and 
concerns of all the stakeholders involved in the provision of mobile money payments 
services.122 
The RBM has signed a memorandum of understanding with two other regulatory bodies, 
namely, MACRA and the FIU, in order to create a secure and favourable operating 
environment for mobile money payments service providers in Malawi.123  
Furthermore, the RBM’s mandate to supervise and regulate mobile money payments is 
derived from section 4(e) of the RBM Act.124 This section empowers the RBM to promote 
and manage payment systems in Malawi.125 Pursuant to section 4(e), the RBM issued the 
Guidelines for Mobile Payment Systems (Mobile Guidelines) to regulate mobile money 
payments in Malawi. They were issued in March 2011. According to Buckley et al, these 
Guidelines represent the dominant regulator of mobile money payments in Malawi.126  
 
                                                          
120 Buckley et al (2015: 453).  
121 Section 48(1) of the RBM Act. 
122 Buckley et al (2015: 454). 
123 Buckley et al (2015: 455).  
124 Buckley et al (2015: 452). 
125 Buckley et al (2015: 452).  
126 Buckley et al (2015: 457). 
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3.2.3 Guidelines for Mobile Payment Systems 
The Mobile Guidelines define a Mobile Network Provider as ‘a mobile phone company 
licensed by the Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority or any other body with 
authority in Malawi’.127 They define a Mobile Financial Payment Service Provider as ‘a 
company that is authorised to provide services that enable the process of money transfer 
and exchange of money for goods and services between two parties using a mobile 
phone’.128 The Mobile Guidelines were issued pursuant to the RBM’s mandate to oversee 
payment systems in Malawi under section 4(e) of the RBM Act.129  
The objective of the Mobile Guidelines is to promote a stable and sound financial structure 
that enables mobile money payments.130 The Mobile Guidelines state explicitly that they 
shall apply only to non-bank based mobile money payments models. These are models 
where the service is provided by a non-bank entity, such as a mobile network operator 
(MNO).131  
The Mobile Guidelines provide that any entity wishing to provide mobile money payments 
services must apply in writing to the RBM for a licence.132 Some of the most crucial 
requirements to be included in the application include the certificate of incorporation as a 
registered company,133 a copy of the licence to operate mobile telecommunications services 
                                                          
127 Definitional section of the Mobile Guidelines. 
128 Definitional section of the Mobile Guidelines. 
129 Paragraph 2.0 of the Mobile Guidelines. 
130 Paragraph 3.0 of the Mobile Guidelines. 
131 Paragraph 4.0 of the Mobile Guidelines.  
132 Paragraph 5.0 of the Mobile Guidelines. 
133 Paragraph 5.1 of the Mobile Guidelines. 
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from MACRA,134 a description of the mobile financial payment service,135 and conditions for 
recruiting network agents and a standard copy of the service level agreement.136 
Where the RBM is satisfied with the entity’s application, it may require the entity to conduct 
a pilot trial of the product. If the RBM is satisfied that the product is safe and viable, it must 
issue a letter of no objection to the entity’s commencement of business and one copy of 
such letter must be furnished to MACRA.137 
Even where a licence has been issued by the RBM, it retains authority to revoke it.138 Some 
of the reasons for revocation which are very relevant to this paper include a situation where 
the RBM is of the view that the mobile money payments service provider does not operate 
in the interest of the public139 and where the mobile money payments service provider 
violates the provisions of the Mobile Guidelines or any other laws and regulations related to 
them.140 It follows then that non-conformity by an entity providing mobile money payments 
services with AML/CFT laws is a ground for revocation of a licence issued by the RBM. 
The Mobile Guidelines address the critical issue of agents who are utilised by mobile money 
payments service providers in the provision of their services.141 They require mobile money 
payments service providers to enter into contracts with agents according to which they 
must exercise reasonable control over the agents.142 Before establishing a business 
relationship with the agents, the service providers must identify independently the agents 
                                                          
134 Paragraph 5.2 of the Mobile Guidelines. 
135 Paragraph 5.3 of the Mobile Guidelines. 
136 Paragraph 5.4 of the Mobile Guidelines. 
137 Paragraph 6.0 of the Mobile Guidelines. 
138 Paragraph 7.0 of the Mobile Guidelines. 
139 Paragraph 7.3 of the Mobile Guidelines. 
140 Paragraph 7.4 of the Mobile Guidelines. 
141 Paragraph 11.0 of the Mobile Guidelines.   
142 Paragraph 11.7 of the Mobile Guidelines. 
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and verify such identity. Where the agent is an individual, the following particulars must be 
identified: the name, address, signature and/or bio-data.143 
If the agent is a registered business, the following documents must be furnished and 
verified: the certificate of incorporation; board approval to operate a mobile money 
payments service; and physical address of head office and list of branches.144 
 The service providers are obligated also to train the agents to ensure that they execute 
their responsibilities effectively.145  The agents on their part are required to report 
suspicious transactions to the mobile money payments service providers to whom they 
account as their principals.146 
The Mobile Guidelines have specific provisions on AML/CFT. They obligate all institutions 
carrying out the business of mobile money payments to report all transactions from agents 
or subscribers to the FIU within three days.147 
Lastly, the Mobile Guidelines require that mobile money payments service providers adhere 
to the Money Laundering Act (2006) and Regulations issued by the FIU from time to time.148 
All the above-mentioned provisions ensure that mobile money payments are operated with 
integrity and at a reduced risk of being utilised for money laundering and terrorist financing 
purposes. 
 
                                                          
143 Paragraph 11.1 of the Mobile Guidelines. 
144 Paragraph 11.2 of the Mobile Guidelines. 
145 Paragraph 11.5 of the Mobile Guidelines. 
146 Paragraph 11.8 of the Mobile Guidelines. 
147 Paragraph 13.1 of the Mobile Guidelines. 
148 Paragraph 13.2 of the Mobile Guidelines. 
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3.2.4 The Financial Services Act (2010) 
This Act is an important enactment in the regulation of financial institutions, of which 
mobile money payments are a part. To be sure, the Act itself does not recognise mobile 
money payments as being part of financial institutions in its definitional section, but since 
they do have a bearing on the integrity and stability of the financial system they thus fall 
under the control of the Act by extension in the broader definition of the term financial 
institution.149 The Act designates the Governor of the RBM as the Registrar of financial 
institutions and bestows upon him or her regulatory and supervisory authority over the 
financial services industry.150 Thus if a mobile money payments service provider is not 
registered in accordance with this Act, it cannot operate such business. The specific 
procedures for registration are provided for under the Act.151 
Under Section 10 of the Act, the Registrar is obligated to execute his supervisory duties in 
order to achieve the highest standards of business conduct by financial institutions152 in the 
interests of guaranteeing the stability of the financial system153 and deterring the 
commission of financial crimes in financial institutions.154  
What is more, the Act requires the Registrar to consult and to enter into arrangements with 
other governmental departments when performing his or regulatory and supervisory 
functions over the financial industry.155 A good example of this is the MOU signed by the 
                                                          
149 Madise S ‘Payment Systems and Mobile Money in Malawi: Towards Financial Inclusion and Financial 
Integrity’, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2531319 (Accessed on 20 January 
2017). 
150 Sections 8(1) and (2) of the Financial Services Act. 
151 Sections 23 and 24 of the Financial Services Act.  
152 Section 10(b) of the Financial Services Act. 
153 Section 10(d) of the Financial Services Act. 
154 Section 10(e) of the Financial Services Act. 
155 Section 19 of the Financial Services Act. 
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RBM, MACRA and the FIU to create an environment conducive to the operation of mobile 
money payments, discussed above.  
As far as AML/CFT obligations are concerned, the Act requires financial institutions to 
demand and record proof of identity whenever dealing with clients, whether occasionally or 
on a regular basis, more especially when it concerns large cash transactions.156 It further 
obligates financial institutions to make STRs to the FIU whenever suspicion of ML/TF arises 
in a transaction.157 
It is an offence under the Act for a financial institution to permit a transaction, including the 
opening of an account, to go through when its employee, officer or director: 
(a) does not take reasonable steps to establish the true identity of the client; 
(b) has doubts as to the authenticity of the documentation furnished by the client; and 
(c) knows or suspects that the funds used in the transaction are proceeds of an 
illegality.158 
3.2.5 The Communications Act 
This is Act that regulates communication services in the country.  It establishes the Malawi 
Communications Regulatory Authority (MACRA) under section 3. One of the main functions 
of MACRA is to license mobile network operators to carry out their business in the 
country.159 Thus, if an MNO is not issued with a licence by MACRA under this Act, it cannot 
                                                          
156 Section 100(1)(a). 
157 Section 100(1)(b). 
158 Sections 100(3)(a), (b) and (c).  
159 Section 5(2)(g)(i) of the Communications Act. 
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engage in the business of providing mobile money payments services in Malawi.160 MACRA 
is listed as one of the oversight bodies with regulatory functions over mobile money 
payments services under the Mobile Guidelines.161 Under the same Mobile Guidelines, the 
RBM must withdraw automatically an MNO’s licence to provide mobile money payments 
services in Malawi in the event of MACRA withdrawing the service provider’s 
telecommunications licence for whatever reason.162 All this signifies that MACRA is an 
important governmental body in the regulation and supervision of mobile money payments 
services in the country. 
3.3  Gaps in the Regulation and Operation of Mobile Money Payments Services and the 
Potential Risk of ML/TF in Malawi 
Mobile money payments services have been touted as agents that foster economic 
development because they help the poor and underprivileged who are under- or unbanked 
to have access to financial services.163 This mobile money revolution has swept many 
countries worldwide, but nowhere on the planet has it flourished and taken hold so 
extensively as in Africa’s sub-Saharan rural areas.164 Malawi has not been bypassed by this 
mobile money payments services revolution. Currently, Malawi has two MNOs which offer 
mobile money services to the nation. These are Telekom Networks Malawi (TNM) and Airtel 
Malawi.165 
                                                          
160 Buckley et al (2015: 458). 
161 Definitional section of the Mobile Guidelines. 
162 Paragraph 7.4 of the Mobile Guidelines. 
163 Kersop M and Du Toit S F ‘Anti-Money Laundering and the Effective Use of Mobile Money in South Africa Pt 
(1)’  Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal (2015) 18(5) 1603 and 1604.   
164 Kersop M and Du Toit S F (2015) 1603. 
165 Buckley et al (2015: 449). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
46 
 
There is ample evidence suggesting that mobile money is crucial for reducing poverty.166 
However, the potential of this important technological innovation to be abused by criminals 
for money laundering and terrorist financing purposes can never be underestimated. The 
FATF, through its New Payment Methods Report of 2006 and the Money Laundering Using 
New Payment Methods typology of 2010, which are discussed above, echoes the sentiments 
that mobile money payments have the potential of being abused for money laundering and 
terrorist financing.167 It thus is of great importance for authorities to make sure that the 
quest to reduce poverty and increase financial inclusion of those under-served by the formal 
financial system should not be pursued at the expense of weakening effective AML/CFT 
measures.168     
As illustrated above, Malawi has a quite elaborate legal framework regulating financial 
institutions on the AML/CFT front. Mobile money payments services providers are a part of 
these financial institutions which fall under the regulation and supervision of this elaborate 
legal framework. Despite the existence of this detailed legal framework, there remain gaps 
and challenges that have the potential of exposing mobile money payments to the risk of 
being abused for money laundering and terrorist financing purposes. This section of the 
paper will highlight and discuss these gaps and challenges. The first part of this section will 
discuss gaps and challenges which are distinctive to the Malawian situation whilst the 
second part will discuss those common to all mobile money payments systems. 
 
                                                          
166 Buckley et al (2015: 439). See also Marina S and Zerzan A ‘Mobile Money: Methodology for Assessing 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risks’ GSMA DISCUSSION PAPER (2010) 4. 
167 FATF Money Laundering Using New Payment Methods (2010: 20). 
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3.3.1  Lack of National Identity Cards 
Malawi does not have a fully-fledged national identification card system.169 The only other 
documents that are relied upon to identify clients are a driver’s licence and a passport, both 
of which are hardly accessible to most Malawians.170 In November 2016, the government 
rolled out a pilot national identification card scheme.171 Under this pilot trial, only 5,000 
Malawians have national identity cards out of a population of close to 17 million people.172 
Until the system is rolled out to cover the whole citizenry, it will remain difficult for financial 
institutions to obtain and verify the identity of their clients. For example, non-Malawians 
have in the past exploited this flaw to obtain Malawian citizenship. This may result 
eventually in undermining Malawi’s efforts to combat ML/TF and it also increases the risk of 
mobile money payments being used for ML/TF purposes since the service providers have no 
reliable documentation on which to base their verification of a client’s identification. This is 
further compounded by the fact that a large segment of the Malawian population has no 
verifiable home addresses.173 
 
 
                                                          
169 Malawi FIU ‘Money Laundering Typologies in Malawi’ (2016) 12 Para 26. See also Nkhoma G B (2012: 34), 
and Buckley et al (2015: 451). 
170 Malawi FIU (2016: 12). 
171 Embassy of the Republic of Malawi Addis Ababa (2016), ‘Ethiopia 5,000 Malawians to get national IDs by 
August’, available at http://malawiembassy-addis.com/5000-malawians-to-get-national-ids-by-august/, 
(Accessed on 11 December 2016). See also Hughes N ‘UK donates $11M to help Malawi launch national ID 
card, available at https://oneworldidentity.com/2016/10/27/uk-donates-11m-to-help-malawi-launch-national-
id-card/, (Accessed on 11 December 2016). 
172 Embassy of the Republic of Malawi Addis Ababa (2016). 
173 Madise S ‘Payment Systems and Mobile Money in Malawi: Towards Financial Inclusion and Financial 
Integrity’, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2531319 (Accessed on 20 January 
2017). 85 percent of Malawians live in rural areas and their households have no postal codes or formal 
residential addresses: See Buckley et al (2015: 447).  
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3.3.2 Non-Registration of SIM Cards on Purchase 
Under Malawian law, there is no requirement for a subscriber to have his or her SIM card 
registered when purchasing it from MNOs or their agents. Non-registration of SIM cards, 
coupled with the lack of national identification cards, encourages anonymity and may lead 
to a situation where a potential money launderer can purchase several SIM cards and use 
them to open several mobile money payments accounts, using several fraudulent identities, 
thereby widening the scheme and speed at which he can launder the proceeds from his 
criminal enterprises.174 This is possible despite the fact that the terms and conditions of 
both MNOs in Malawi stipulate that a client may open only one mobile money payments 
account.  
3.3.3 Malawi is a Largely Cash-Based Economy 
Malawi is a cash-based economy.175 In Malawi, cash is the dominant form of money used in 
commercial transactions. This exposes mobile money payments to the greater risk of being 
utilised for ML/TF purposes because both Airtel and TNM allow their clients’ transaction on 
their accounts to be funded using cash. This is very attractive to criminals because it is very 
difficult to trace cash. It leads to a situation where there are no or insufficient paper trails 
regarding the funding transaction and the origin of the funds.176 All one needs to do is go to 
a registered agent and give him cash, which is then converted to stored e-value which can 
then be transferred to another person or used to purchase goods. Thus, it becomes difficult 
for financial institutions such as mobile money payments service providers to differentiate 
                                                          
174 Money Laundering Using New Payment Methods (2010: 25 Para 73).   
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between legal and illegal or unusual transactions.177 This problem is exacerbated by the fact 
that TNM and Airtel do not require the inclusion of originator information from the initiator 
of a mobile money payments transaction. This loophole enables criminals to launder the 
proceeds of their crimes through mobile money payments.  
3.3.4  Employment of Generic AML/CFT Procedures by Staff of Financial Institutions 
 One of the challenges in the AML/CFT campaign is that most financial institutions put in 
place and implement generic AML/CFT measures just to be seen to be in conformity with 
the requirements set by regulatory and supervisory authorities, without doing more to 
achieve the intended objectives of those requirements. The RBM has noted that most 
Malawian financial institutions conduct only generic AML/CFT measures. It noted that 
financial institutions had enormous deficits and were falling seriously short in customer 
identification and verification processes, record keeping of client information, ongoing 
monitoring of customer transactions, ML/TF risk assessment of customers, products and 
services, delivery methods and geographical locations.178 It has noted further that financial 
institutions conduct limited and generic AML/CFT staff training which does not cover all 
legislative requirements and specialised business areas.179  
The same applies to agents, who are not trained to conduct proper and thorough AML/CFT 
measures. Some of them are more concerned with making a commission and choose 
purposely to ignore conducting AML/CFT procedures as required of them by the Mobile 
Guidelines discussed above. The situation becomes even worse where agents are not 
subject to any strict AML/CFT obligations. All these obligations rest on the principal service 
                                                          
177 Malawi FIU (2016: 11 Para 25). 
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providers. This is troublesome because all the liability for not carrying out AML/CFT 
measures falls squarely on the principal. This does not create an incentive for agents to 
follow the AML/CFT measures. For instance, under the Mobile Guidelines agents are 
obligated only to send STRs to mobile money payments service providers.180 This is risky 
because agents are the ones involved mainly in the registration of clients on behalf of the 
service providers. Thus, there is a possibility that they can register clients without verifying 
their true identity, thereby exposing the products to the danger of being exploited for 
ML/TF.   
Having considered the gaps and challenges which are specific to Malawi, the discussion will 
now focus on the challenges that are common to mobile money payments services in 
general. 
3.3.5  Absence of Credit Risk  
This issue concerns situations where MNOs that provide mobile money payments services 
have no incentive to obey AML/CFT obligations strictly, because all the funds used to make 
the transactions on the service are prepaid.181 Since the funds are prepaid by the clients 
using the service, the MNOs do not have any credit risk. They operate on the assumption 
that they have nothing to lose, therefore do not see the need to obtain full and accurate 
information about the customer and the nature of the business relationship.182 
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3.3.6 Speed of Transactions  
New payment methods such as mobile money payments are designed in such a way that the 
transactions are conducted rapidly. Funds are transferred with utmost speed and are 
converted from one form to another with ease. This is attractive to money launderers and 
presents a challenge to supervisory and law enforcement agencies in tracing and 
investigating the proceeds of crime.183 
3.3.7 Non-Face to Face Business Relationship  
Some mobile money payments are designed in such a way that there is no face to face 
interaction between the clients and the providers. This increases the threat of ML/TF in the 
mobile money payments products as an  increased incidence of impersonation raises the 
risk of fraud being perpetrated since customers may not be who they say they are.184 
3.4 Financial Inclusion 
Financial inclusion is another major issue that features prominently in the discourse on 
mobile money payments. It has been defined as ‘ensuring access to appropriate financial 
products and services at an affordable cost in a fair and transparent manner’.185 This access 
has to be provided to the financially excluded who are also referred to as the unbanked.186 
The problem of financial exclusion cropped up as a result of reluctance on the part of banks 
to provide banking arrangements and financial services to poor and low income 
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communities. The reason for this unwillingness has to do with the fact that the high 
transaction costs and poor returns for the banks.187 As a consequence, people are excluded 
from the formal financial system. In 2015, there were 2.5 billion adults worldwide who were 
officially excluded from the formal financial system.188 This is a figure of epic proportions. 
The situation of excluded people is dire as they cannot be cushioned from economic shocks 
which, in turn, perpetuates the cycle of poverty.189 Therefore, the initiative to achieve 
financial inclusion has developed into a vital international policy in the fight against the 
scourge of poverty.190 This effort is exemplified by the fact that organisations and forums 
such as the G20 summits, the Global Policy Forum (GPF) of Alliance for Financial Inclusion 
(AFI), Better than Cash Alliance (BTCA), FATF and the Basel Committee on Financial Inclusion 
have all championed the importance of inclusion in the fight against poverty.191 
Mobile money has been hailed as an important medium through which financial inclusion of 
the global unbanked adult population can be achieved.192 This is so because the mobile 
phone technology has been adopted by a huge portion of the world’s population. It is the 
most widely adopted form of modern technology in history.193 Besides, in 2006 the mobile 
phone achieved the milestone of being the first piece of communications technology to 
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have more users in developing countries than in the developed world.194 The mobile phone 
enables even those situated in inaccessible rural areas to gain access to financial services 
through mobile money payments services.195 The reason is that the acquisition of a mobile 
phone does not require the user to install as a prerequisite new technological infrastructure 
since it utilises the already existing infrastructure.196 Once the people in the rural areas 
begin accessing these financial services through mobile phones, they become enticed to join 
the formal financial system, hence achieving the goal financial inclusion.197 
3.4.1 Balancing AML/CFT Obligations and Financial Inclusion 
Despite mobile money payments being promoted as catalysts for financial inclusion, some 
have argued that the possibility of these services being utilised by criminals for purposes of 
money laundering and terrorist financing should not overlooked.198 It has been asserted that 
there should be a balance between the two, by which is meant that, in order not to stifle 
the potential for financial inclusion, regulators have been asked to strike a balance in 
addressing the AML/CFT risks which have the potential of plaguing the mobile money 
payments industry and promoting innovation.199 
It has been argued also that financial inclusion and the need to protect mobile money 
payments services from being used for money laundering and terrorist financing purposes 
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need to be viewed as complementary and not competing objectives, if the balance between 
the two is to be achieved by mobile money payments regulators.200 
In order to strike a balance between these two financial sector policy objectives, it has been 
argued that mobile money regulators should adopt a two-pronged approach. The regulators 
are urged to adopt an enabling and proportionate approach to the regulation of mobile 
money payments services. Each of these to concepts is explained below. 
 
(a) Enabling Approach 
An enabling approach is an approach where the regulator is not only tasked with the duties 
to achieve financial stability, integrity and consumer protection, but also with the obligation 
to achieve financial inclusion of those under-served by the formal financial system. Thus, 
regulators must produce regulatory initiatives that are essential for the development and 
flourishing of mobile money payments services.201 
(b) Proportionate Regulation 
This second part of the two-pronged approach hinges on the contents of the regulatory 
instruments relied upon by the regulator. It is the duty of the regulator to ensure that the 
costs that incurred by both financial institutions providing mobile money payments services 
and customers are commensurate to the risks that are being addressed, especially when 
regard is had to the benefits that are expected from the product.202  The justification for 
proportionality is that excessive regulation, including AML/CFT regulation, over-burdens 
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financial institutions, thereby stifling business and economic growth.203 Thus, the 
proportionate regulation of mobile money payments services safeguards the mobile money 
payments products from AML/CFT risks and helps create an environment conducive to 
innovation and healthy business which, in turn, fosters economic growth.  
3.5  The Regulation of Mobile Money Payments Services in Kenya: The Case of M-PESA  
The most successful implementation of a mobile money payments service is that of M-PESA. 
This is a Kenyan mobile money payments service system that was launched in 2007 by the 
Vodafone Group and Kenya’s leading mobile network operator, Safaricom, after a successful 
pilot trial in 2005.204 It has been hailed as one of the most successful mobile money 
payments service in the world. This assertion is backed by the sheer number of clients 
registered to the service and the number of transactions conducted through it.205 Although 
launched only in 2007, by May 2008 the service had two million registered customers.206 
This figure rose to more than six million registered customers in 2009.207 The number of 
registered active users of the service more than doubled, to reach 15.2 million in 2011.208 
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Statistics show that in 2013 over 2 million transactions were conducted over the M-PESA 
service every day,209 and this translated to US$4.98 billion worth of transactions conducted 
in a year.210 In a span of five years since the launch of the M-PESA service in Kenya, over 
US$1.4 trillion in peer to peer transactions have been transferred through the service.211 It 
has been averred that this means that ‘M-PESA processes more transactions domestically 
than Western Union does globally’.212   
It goes without saying that a service that has a high number of registered users and 
conducts transactions of this magnitude on a daily basis will be on the radar of regulatory 
authorities and raise AML/CFT risk concerns. The section below discusses how the 
regulatory authorities in Kenya control the mobile money payments service of M-PESA. 
In 2007, when the M-PESA service was launched, the Kenyan regulatory authorities adopted 
the strategy of regulating mobile money payments services in the same way as banks had 
been traditionally regulated. They did this by merely extending the pre-existing regulations 
which are applicable traditionally to banks to mobile money payments services.213 The 
measures employed to control money laundering and conduct AML/CFT procedures such as 
KYC, CDD, STR and mandatory record keeping were contained in generally applicable 
criminal law statutes.214 This position changed in 2009 with the passage of the Proceeds of 
Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act, which imposed more rigorous AML/CFT regulations 
and made all the FATF Recommendations applicable to and mandatory for all financial 
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institutions.215 Thus Safaricom is also covered. In 2011, the Kenyan legislature passed the 
National Payment Systems Act, which imposes the same obligations on mobile money 
payments and traditional banking institutions.216 
The registration of customers and protection of the service from being abused by identity 
fraudsters for money laundering and terrorist financing purposes has been aided greatly by 
the fact that Kenya has a functioning national identity system.217 
Despite having rigorous AML/CFT regulations and a fully established national identity 
system, the safeguarding of the M-PESA from money laundering has also to a large extent 
depended on the establishment of and compliance with voluntary internal AML/CFT 
procedures and programmes by Safaricom. These procedures have centred on three key 
areas, namely, (a) agent training, (b) internal KYC procedures and (c) strict transaction 
monitoring.218 
(A) Agent Training 
Safaricom has invested huge effort and expended considerable resources to train agents for 
its M-PESA mobile money service in the observance of AML/CFT controls. 
Agents are made to undergo an intensive training, covering the entire operating scheme and 
Safaricom’s own AML/CFT and KYC procedures.219 This type of training is also undergone by 
members of staff at all levels of the establishment and is audited annually to check for 
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compliance deficiencies and areas that require improvement by the Vodafone Group Money 
Laundering Reporting Office.220 
(B) Internal KYC Procedures 
Under the M-PESA mobile money payment service, both customers registered on the 
service and agents who play a crucial role in its functioning are subject to in-depth KYC 
procedures.221 
In addition, Safaricom has adopted an automated screening mechanism used to screen 
people who are politically exposed and those who are on the international sanctions or 
terror list. This is done to reduce the risk of its mobile money service being used for money 
laundering and terrorist financing purposes.222 
(C) Strict Transaction Monitoring 
In its quest to reduce the risk of its mobile money service being utilised for money 
laundering and terrorist financing purposes, Safaricom has placed limits on transactions and 
has implemented a policy of conducting on-going monitoring of transactions in relation to 
customers who are still utilising the service.223 
It bears noting that, despite a rigorous regulatory legal regime being in place, Safaricom has 
gone to great lengths to reduce the risks of its mobile money service being utilised by 
criminals for money laundering and terrorist financing purposes.224 By and large, this has 
helped make M-PESA a considerably secure service. This shows that, for the fight against 
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money laundering and terrorist financing to be successful, it is essential that all the 
stakeholders play a substantial role in the bigger scheme of things. 
3.6 Conformity to FATF Standards by Malawian Regulatory Authorities and Mobile    
Money Payments Service Providers 
As discussed above, Malawi has made great strides in order to conform to the FATF 
AML/CFT international standards by enacting the Money Laundering Act, other pieces of 
legislation and guidelines addressing the area of economic criminality. However, going by 
the 2014 RBM Annual Report which stated that most financial institutions have established 
and apply only generic AML/CFT procedures in relation to customer identification, record 
keeping of client information, ongoing monitoring of customer transactions and ML/TF risk 
assessment of customers, products and services, delivery methods and geographical 
locations, then, at best, Malawi is only partially compliant with AML/CFT international 
standards. 
It is worrying that Malawian financial institutions spend only limited resources to train their 
staff in comprehensive AML/CFT procedures - training which has been labelled by the 
Central Bank as generic. Apart from this, there is no concrete evidence showing that mobile 
money payments service providers have set aside substantial resources to train agents who 
are essential players in the functioning of mobile money payments services. Despite all the 
above-mentioned shortcomings, the regulatory authorities have refrained from imposing 
sanctions against defaulters or reprimanding them. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
60 
 
All these shortfalls in the enforcement of AML/CFT international standards need to be 
remedied because they expose mobile money payments products to a high risk of being 
misused for money laundering and terrorist purposes.  
3.7 Conclusion 
Mobile money payments are a relatively a new phenomenon in Malawi as they were 
introduced only in 2012. They present a unique opportunity to enhance the financial 
inclusion of Malawi’s unbanked population which is worryingly under-served by the formal 
financial system. This is so because most Malawians have access to a mobile phone and 
hence MNOs do not have to establish an expensive information technology infrastructure to 
bring their mobile money payments services to the doorsteps of the unbanked population. 
Thus, the mobile phone serves to cut the operational costs of providing financial services to 
the unbanked. 
Despite being flaunted as a crucial mechanism for financial inclusion of the unbanked, there 
are gaps and challenges which expose mobile money payments to the high risk of being 
misused by criminals for money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The gaps and 
challenges include the country’s having no national identification system, non-registration 
of SIM cards on purchase, funding mobile money payments transactions using mainly cash, 
the employment of generic AML/CFT procedures by financial institutions and their staff and 
the partial compliance with FATF international standards by the general financial sector and 
the regulatory bodies. 
The partial compliance with the FATF international standards occurs despite the fact that 
Malawi has in place a comprehensive AML/CFT regulatory legal framework. It is therefore 
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imperative that the responsible authorities formulate deliberate executive policies and an 
action plan to address the challenges highlighted above. Such an initiative would go a long 
way to reduce the risk of mobile money payments being used for purposes of money 
laundering and terrorist financing. In order to achieve this goal, the responsible authorities 
can borrow a leaf or two from their counterparts in Kenya as regards  the evolutionary 
process they followed  to regulate the M-PESA service efficiently. 
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Chapter Four 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
4.1 General Conclusions 
Criminals and terrorist financiers have become wary of using the formal financial system to 
launder the proceeds of their criminal enterprises or to bankroll terrorist organisations. This 
state of affairs has been brought about by the concerted global efforts aimed at eradicating 
money laundering and terrorist financing.225 Thus, criminals and terrorist sponsors have 
turned to alternative methods which do not involve the formal financial system to launder 
their proceeds and fund terrorist organisations.226 One such alternative method involves 
laundering money using mobile money payments. This paper has discussed the potential 
which mobile money payments have to be used by criminals in order to clean the proceeds 
of their crimes so as to create a gulf between themselves and the predicate offence, or by 
terrorist financiers to finance terrorist organisations who are hell-bent on carrying out 
terrorist attacks around the globe. The paper has also highlighted the loopholes which 
increase the risk of Malawian mobile money payments being exploited by criminal elements 
for money laundering and terrorist financing purposes. 
The following are the recommendations which the author believes, if adopted, would go a 
long way in reducing the risk of mobile money payments being used to launder criminal 
proceeds or to finance terrorist groups. 
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 4.2 Establishing a National Identification System 
As pointed out above, Malawi does not have a national identity card issued to its citizens. 
This makes it difficult to identify Malawians properly. It thus becomes cumbersome for 
financial institutions such as mobile money payments service providers to differentiate 
between Malawians and non-Malawians. It is also hard to establish the authenticity of a 
person’s identity in the absence of a national identity card. The alternative documents 
which are relied upon by Malawian authorities and financial institutions to establish the true 
identity and verify a person’s personal details are passports and driver’s licences. The 
problem with these alternative documents of identification is that they are not accessible 
easily to all Malawians. They are costly, which means only a privileged few Malawians can 
afford to obtain them. These documents are also ones that an ordinary Malawian will 
endeavour to have only if the need arises. Accordingly, when no need exists to have a 
driver’s licence or passport, an average Malawian has no incentive to come into the 
possession of such documents. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that there is no 
central automated bio-data storage centre. The establishment of an efficient national 
identification system would be hugely helpful for mobile money payments service providers 
in carrying out their AML/CFT obligations of customer identification and verification. 
4.3 Extending all AML/CFT Obligations Imposed by Law to Agents 
Agents are crucial players in the functioning efficiency of mobile money payments. They 
perform most of the essential functions, such as registration of customers and the execution 
of most transactions initiated by customers through the service. At present, not all the 
AML/CFT obligations are imposed on agents. According to the Mobile Guidelines, agents are 
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required to report only suspicious transactions to their  principal, who in this case happens 
to be the MNO providing the mobile money payments service. If all the AML/CFT obligations 
were extended to the entire spectrum of agents, this would reduce greatly the risk of 
mobile money payments being utilised for purposes of money laundering and terrorist 
financing.  
4.4 Adoption and Application of Comprehensive AML/CFT Procedures by Financial 
Institutions 
Financial institutions need to endeavour to adopt and apply robust internal AML/CFT 
measures in the provision of their services to their customers. These measures should cover 
areas such as customer identification and verification, staff and agent training, record 
keeping, on-going transaction monitoring and product risk assessment. This assists much in 
giving effect to the applicable laws. Currently, financial institutions are criticised by the 
Central Bank for applying purely generic AML/CFT measures. 
4.5 Registration of SIM Cards on Purchase 
Subscribers should be legally compelled to register with the MNO whenever they purchase a 
SIM card. This would help combat anonymity and the risk of criminals using fraudulent 
identities to open several mobile money accounts to be used to launder their criminal 
proceeds. Under Malawian law as it currently stands, it is not a requirement to register a 
SIM card with an MNO upon purchase.  
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4.6 Investment in Information Communication Technology (ICT) 
Malawi lags behind in the use of ICT in its quest to meet its international AML/CFT 
obligations. The bulk of information is stored manually. This affects the quality of the 
records which financial institutions are required to keep under the FATF standards. 
Investment in proper ICT infrastructure would go a long way to remedy this deficiency. 
ICT would also help financial institutions to monitor transactions automatically by cross-
checking their clients against international sanctions or terror list data bases, thereby 
reducing the risk of their products being abused for ML/TF purposes and saving time.  
4.7 Conducting National and Product Risk Assessment 
Recommendation 1 of the FATF international standards requires countries to conduct 
national risk assessments in order to identify areas which are vulnerable to be exploited for 
ML/TF purposes. The outcome of the Malawi national risk assessment that started in 2013 is 
yet to be published. The country is thus still operating in the dark as to which areas are 
susceptible to ML/TF purposes.  
The FATF’s Recommendation requires financial institutions also to assess the ML/TF risks of 
their products. A national and product risk assessment would assist in establishing the exact 
extent to which mobile money payments are prone to be utilised as vehicles for money 
laundering, and a risk assessment would help also to determine the amount of resources to 
be used to mitigate such risks. 
The recommendations made in this paper are essential for the proper functioning of the 
mobile money payments industry in Malawi. They will serve to eliminate all the gaps and 
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challenges that make the financial sector and the economy in general vulnerable to 
economic criminals. Moreover, adopting effective measures would promote the integrity 
and stability of the financial system, which would help advance the drive towards financial 
inclusion of the financially excluded population.   
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